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Notes
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE:
THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF EARLY
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
NICHOLAS DIMASCIO
INTRODUCTION
An ever-increasing proportion of U.S. business leaders and a
number of influential think tanks expect that a nationwide climate
change regulatory program will be enacted in the United States
within the next ten years. Several factors are increasing the pressure
to shift United States climate policy from voluntary programs to
mandatory, nationwide regulation of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. First, scientists have reached a near-worldwide
consensus that climate change is real and human induced.1 Second,
there has been an upsurge in global warming-related litigation against
governmental and corporate actors.2 Third, the link between good
corporate governance and assessment of climate change risk has
gained credibility as insurance companies and investors have begun to
demand this information.3

Copyright © 2007 by Nicholas DiMascio.
1. The national science academies of the Group of Eight (G8) nations, which includes the
United States, signed a joint statement on climate change that states that the science is now
sufficiently clear to justify taking prompt regulatory action at the national level. Global
Response to Climate Change, STATEMENT (Joint Sci. Acad.), June 7, 2005, at 1–2, available at
http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf.
2. See Lori R. Baker, Global Warming: Attorneys General Declare Public Nuisance, 27 U.
HAW. L. REV. 525, 525–26 (2005) (describing the development of public nuisance suits brought
by private “attorneys general” against utility companies with the goal of reducing carbon
dioxide emissions); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public
Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 408–09
(2005) (describing a trend of public nuisance suits brought against power corporations with the
goal of requiring a reduction in emissions).
3. See Elizabeth E. Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate
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Most importantly, corporations are facing new regulatory risks
related to climate change. U.S. multinational corporations often have
operations in nations that have enacted mandatory emissions
4
regulations in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol’s first compliance
period, which begins in 2008. Individual U.S. states have also begun
enacting their own mandatory greenhouse gas reduction regulations
to fill the void left by federal inaction. Such states include the seven
northeastern states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative5 (RGGI) and California.6
These trends have begun to reverse the tide against nationwide
greenhouse gas regulation in the United States. The leaders of many
corporations consider greenhouse gas regulation inevitable and fear
having to comply with a diverse array of regulatory requirements
from individual states.7 Major businesses leaders have publicly called
for a national regulatory program and Congress has begun to
8
respond. Nearly one hundred climate change-related proposals were
introduced in the 108th Congress,9 over one hundred were introduced

Risk of Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 239 (2005) (noting that an increase in scientific knowledge regarding
climate change has correlated with an increase in investors’ attention to corporate activities); J.
Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate
Counsel—It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 102 (2004) (noting that the world’s
second largest reinsurance company now inquires into whether corporations seeking directors
and officers liability insurance have developed a plan to address the liability risk of climate
change); Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American
Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L. REV. 493, 513 (2002) (noting that an alliance of “consumer
groups, socially responsible investors, labor unions, environmentalists, and human rights
activists . . . have begun to agitate against recent changes in the global economy” and have
“shifted their attention to multinational firms and international organizations”).
4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
5. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/states.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007).
6. California Climate Change Portal, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/about.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007).
7. Climate Change: EPA Program Preps Companies for Emissions Trading at Home and
Abroad, GREENWIRE, Jan. 26, 2005, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2005/01/26/#1 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007).
8. Climate: PG&E CEO Calls for U.S. to Cap Greenhouse Gas Emissions, GREENWIRE,
Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2006/10/06/archive/#10 (last visited Apr. 16,
2007).
9. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 108th Congress Proposals,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/108th.cfm (last visited Jan. 7,
2007).
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10
in the 109th Congress, and several bills that would establish
mandatory reductions of greenhouse gas emissions appear poised for
introduction in the next session.11 With the dramatic changes in
membership in both the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the 110th Congress, some in Washington speculate that federal action
on climate change could come sooner rather than later.12
In the meantime, corporations and other organizations have
been participating in voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction
programs to prepare for eventual federal regulations.13 These early
actors realize that emissions reductions are costly but understand that
failing to prepare for mandatory emissions limits will increase their
costs of compliance even further. If early movers’ current efforts do
not comport with yet to be enacted standards, however, early action
could in fact increase their costs of compliance. The state and
voluntary programs that exist employ a diverse array of standards and
requirements, and each of the bills floating in Congress would
establish an emissions reduction program with different parameters.
Faced with the risk of achieving reductions that will not be credited
later, greenhouse gas emitters would no doubt prefer to adopt a waitand-see strategy for coping with climate change regulation. But if
mandatory emissions limits truly are inevitable, postponing action
due to regulatory uncertainty is both economically inefficient and
environmentally harmful.
If the United States enacts a cap-and-trade system for
greenhouse gas emissions, the program will likely acknowledge and
reward some emissions reductions achieved before the program
formally goes into effect.14 A future federal program may limit credit
for early reductions to those entities that have monitored, verified,
and registered the reductions in accordance with a voluntary registry

10. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 109th Congress Proposals,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/109th.cfm (last visited Jan. 7,
2007).
11. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
12. Charles Babington, Party Shift May Make Warming a Hill Priority, WASH. POST, Nov.
18, 2006, at A06; see also Janet Hook & Richard Simon, Climate Is Changing, Politically: New
Attention from Presidential Hopefuls and Others that Global Warming Is Not Just the
Democrats’ Issue Anymore, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at A1 (describing recent bipartisan
congressional interest in climate change).
13. See infra Part I.
14. Three of the four proposed regulations reviewed in Part III contain explicit provisions
for crediting early action, and the fourth leaves the possibility open to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) administrator’s discretion.
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or mandatory state regulatory program. A federal program could also
place limits on the types of reduction activities that will be credited or
the amount of early credits that can be used for compliance. Early
emissions reducers should therefore tailor their current activities to
be as closely aligned with the parameters of a future federal program
as possible.
This Note aims to inform greenhouse gas emitters and
policymakers about the efficiency, equity, and environmental benefits
of providing credit for early emissions reductions. Part I presents the
emerging belief that federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is
inevitable. Part II explores the arguments for and against providing
early actors with future regulatory credit for their current emissions
reductions. Part III explains the lack of a legal basis for providing
prospective credit for early emissions reductions and the need to
register current emissions reductions in a voluntary registry. Part IV
identifies the design elements of a future mandatory cap on
greenhouse gas emissions that will affect early emissions reducers’
ability to claim credit for past emissions reductions. It then reviews
and evaluates the early crediting provisions within several
congressionally proposed cap-and-trade systems. In conclusion, this
Note advocates a particular legislative method for providing early
action credit, suggests guidelines for how emitters should structure
their early reduction efforts, and advises early actors to oppose
legislation that fails to recognize those early reduction efforts.
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION
There is no federal regulation requiring the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions within the United States, but many industry
analysts and think tanks believe that is likely to change soon. A joint
report released by Citigroup Investment Research and the World
Resources Institute in June of 2006 states that pressures on the U.S.
government to regulate greenhouse gases are nearing a “tipping
point.”15 Point Carbon, a market analyst and forecasting company for
power, gas, and carbon markets believes that there is a “high
likelihood” that the U.S. federal government will establish a

15.

CITIGROUP INV. RESEARCH & WORLD RESOURCES INST., INVESTING IN SOLUTIONS
6 (2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).

TO CLIMATE CHANGE
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16
regulatory system before 2013. In October of 2006, the Pew Center
on Global Climate Change released the results of a survey of twentyfour leading American companies about the possibility of federal
17
regulation of greenhouse gases. Twenty-two responded that federal
regulation was “imminent,” and, of these, sixteen believed that it
would come between 2010 and 2015.18 The reports cite state and
regional regulatory initiatives, growing concern among the general
public, pressure from corporations, institutional investors, and
insurance companies, and even private lawsuits as the catalysts for
19
change at the federal level.
These predictions are borne out by recent action in the United
States Congress. Although the 109th Congress voted down a bill that
would have created a federal cap-and-trade system for greenhouse
20
gases, it approved a nonbinding “Sense of the Senate” resolution
that Congress should enact “mandatory, market-based limits” on
21
greenhouse gas emissions. In April of 2006, the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, led by Senators Pete V. Domenici
and Jeff Bingaman, solicited the opinions of industry, nonprofit, and
academic thinkers on a white paper entitled “Design Elements of a
Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System.”22 No
fewer than six separate proposals for climate change legislation were
23
introduced in the 109th Congress, several of which could be

16. Point Carbon, Carbon Trading in the US: The Hibernating Giant, CARBON MARKET
ANALYST Sept. 13, 2006, at 14, available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/getfile.php/
fileelement_86516/CMA_US_ETS_Sept06__hkh9gtpd_1f.pdf.
17. ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE: CORPORATE STRATEGIES
THAT ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
PEW%5FCorpStrategies%2Epdf.
18. Id. at 1–3.
19. Id.
20. This bill was the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005,
discussed infra Part IV. S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
21. 151 CONG. REC. S7033–37 (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (Sense of the Senate on Climate
Change, amending H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)).
22. Climate Change: Conf. Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., S. REP. NO. 109420 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:28095.wais; see also White Paper, Sen. Pete V.
Domenici & Jeff Bingaman, Design Elements of a Mandatory Mkt.-Based Greenhouse Gas
Regulatory Sys. (Feb. 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing a potential national
regulatory program for greenhouse gases).
23. See Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. (2006); Global
Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006); Clean Air Planning Act of 2006,
S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006); Keep America Competitive Global Warming Policy Act of 2006,
H.R. 5049, 109th Cong. (2006); 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing
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reintroduced or serve as models for proposals during the 110th
Congress. Senator Barbara Boxer, the incoming chairwoman of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in 2007 and a
cosponsor of a previous climate change bill, has already created two
24
new subcommittees with jurisdiction over climate change.
Emitters of greenhouse gases in the United States that anticipate
the enactment of such legislation have already begun to account for
their emissions, to achieve emissions reductions, and to participate in
federal, state, and private voluntary initiatives. As of October of 2006,
over one hundred companies had voluntarily agreed to inventory and
reduce their carbon emissions through the Environmental Protection
25
Agency’s Climate Leaders Program. The number of companies
submitting emissions data to the Department of Energy (DOE) in
2004 as part of its Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases
Program (1605(b) Program) reached 226.26 Similarly, the Chicago
Climate Exchange, a private carbon emissions trading market that
also imposes mandatory emissions limitations upon participants, has
over 150 members from both the public and private sectors.27
Companies participating in such initiatives believe that their
early efforts will help to reduce their future costs, serve as positive
publicity, and provide them with a stronger voice in the design of
28
federal climate change policy. Many also believe that innovation in
response to climate change will become a source of considerable
29
profit for certain forward-thinking companies. As state level
regulatory programs come into effect, many more companies will be
accounting for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions prior to the
institution of a federal regulatory regime. Future federal legislation

an amendment, the Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong.
(2005)); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
24. Senator Boxer Reorganizes Environment Panel, Naming Two Global Warming
Subcommittees, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 46 (2006).
25. Press Release, EPA, Companies Set Aggressive Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction
Goals (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a8f952395381d39
68525701c005e65b5/abaf76a31c93d2e685257205006305cb!OpenDocument.
26. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEPT. OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF
GREENHOUSE GASES 2004 ix (2006), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/envir
onment/0608(04).pdf.
27. Chicago Climate Exchange, Members of the Chicago Climate Exchange,
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/about/members.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
28. CITIGROUP INV. RESEARCH & WORLD RESEARCH INST., supra note 15, at 6.
29. Id.
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will therefore have to consider how to treat these early emissions
reductions.
II. THE EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF
EARLY ACTION CREDIT
Although it appears likely, credit for early emissions reductions
under future climate change legislation is by no means certain. Even
if such legislation provides credit, it may also place severe restrictions
on the amount or use of early action credits. This Part seeks to inform
greenhouse gas emitters and policymakers about the equitable,
efficiency, and environmental benefits that would accrue from
providing broad credit for early action.
Calling actions “early” is somewhat of a misnomer—some
amount of climate change is already certain to result from past
emissions.30 It remains crucial, however, that greenhouse gas emitters
not wait until a mandatory regime is put in place to reduce their
emissions. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere long after
they are emitted,31 so present emissions reductions are highly
important for realizing the goal of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): “to achieve . . .
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.”32 Scientists predict that a doubling of the
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere from
preindustrial levels will have dramatic consequences for the earth’s
33
climate. Failure to achieve modest reductions in the short term may
require more severe measures over the long term to avoid doubling
atmospheric concentrations of CO2.34

30. UNEP & UNFCCC, CLIMATE CHANGE INFORMATION KIT 5 (2002), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/infokit_2002_en.pdf.
31. CEDRIC PHILIBERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY,
BEYOND KYOTO 13 (2002).
32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
33. Ann P. Kinzig & Daniel M. Kammen, National Trajectories of Carbon Emissions:
Analysis of Proposals to Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon Economies, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 183, 184 (1998).
34. Id.
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Early action is also an economically efficient means to smooth
35
society’s transition into a carbon-capped world. Greenhouse gas
emitters will bear transaction costs in adapting to any new regulatory
36
regime. Market-based regulatory instruments, such as emissions
trading, will lower the economic costs of regulation only if the
transaction costs imposed upon regulated entities do not exceed other
37
efficiency gains. Transaction costs of such systems include “search
and information costs, negotiation costs, approval costs, [and]
monitoring and enforcement costs.”38 Indeed, the level of transaction
costs imposed upon regulated entities can heavily influence the
success of an emissions trading scheme. Early experimentation in
emissions reduction and trading helps reduce overall societal
transaction costs by overcoming socioeconomic inertia to invest in
emissions abatement39 and by providing society with a wealth of
knowledge gained from “learning-by-doing.”40
Such early action will only take place if greenhouse gas emitters
have an incentive to reduce emissions prior to regulation. Emitters’
diminished effort levels reflect their uncertainty over their obligations
within a future federal regulatory program.41 They hesitate to reduce
their emissions prior to the enactment of legislation because if the
program is not designed to recognize early emissions reductions,
conscientious early actors will effectively be penalized relative to
those that continue emitting at business-as-usual levels.42 Assurance
that the future federal program will provide some level of recognition
for early action is therefore necessary to encourage greenhouse gas
emitters to begin reducing emissions prior to the effective date of the

35. Haoran Pan & Denise Van Regemorter, The Costs & Benefits of Early Action Before
Kyoto Compliance, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1477, 1478 (2004).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also DANIEL J. DUDEK & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION AND DEV., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 15 (1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/33/2392058.pdf (noting the
transaction costs of alternative climate change policies).
39. Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global
Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicability, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 111 (1992).
40. Pan & Regemorter, supra note 35, at 1478.
41. ROBERT R. NORDHAUS ET AL., ANALYSIS OF EARLY ACTION CREDITING PROPOSALS
6 (1998), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/pol%5Fearly%2Epdf.
42. See id.(“[M]any companies are concerned that current emissions reductions may not be
recognized in a future regulatory program.”).
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regulation and thereby smooth the transition of the economy and
43
benefit the global environment.
For example, if the federal government adopts a cap-and-trade
system for greenhouse gas emissions, it will place a cap on the
nation’s total emissions for a given year and then allocate the
emissions budget among regulated entities in the form of tradable
permits. Entities covered by the program will only be allowed to emit
a quantity of greenhouse gases equal to the amount of permits they
hold. Because the number of permits is limited, a fundamental
component of any such program is to determine how to allocate the
44
permits among covered entities. Typically, permits are provided for
free to emitters in an amount proportionate to their historical level of
45
emissions during some period of time, called their “baseline.” The
baseline of an entity regulated under a cap-and-trade system
effectively defines that entity’s entitlement to valuable emissions
rights, so emitters are quite concerned about the method by which it
is set.
Early emissions reducers have good reason to be especially
concerned about their baselines. If a company achieved emissions
reductions through voluntary programs at a time before the period
that will determine its baseline, it will be allotted fewer permits than
if it had continued doing business as usual.46 It will therefore have to
accomplish even further reductions or purchase extra permits on the
market to meet its compliance obligations. Taking into account the
law of diminishing returns and the fact that the entity may have
already picked the low-hanging fruit, early emissions reductions can
lead to much higher marginal costs of compliance for regulated
entities if they are ignored when setting an entity’s baseline.

43. Id. at 6.
44. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 134–42
(2005).
45. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 865, 920–21 (2005).
46. Axel Michaelowa & Marcus Stronzik, Early Crediting of Emissions Reductions—A
Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, in EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 185,
186 (Carlo Carraro ed., 2000).
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Emitters of any substantial quantity of greenhouse gases are
47
likely aware that early action may increase compliance costs.
Accordingly, if they are not able to predict how their baseline will be
calculated under a future emissions regime, they will be less
motivated to achieve early emissions reductions.48 Furthermore, if the
baseline period is set to a time after early emissions reductions have
taken place, an early actor’s compliance costs will be higher than an
entity that undertakes no emissions reductions until regulation is in
place.49 Because early actors help reduce overall emissions and
transaction costs for society, punishing such behavior would be
50
inequitable and inefficient. Setting a company’s baseline to a time
before it achieves emissions reductions will move the emitter closer to
meeting its emissions budget under a future cap, thereby producing a
more equitable and more efficient result.51
The effect of early emissions reductions on the total national
permit budget also raises important questions of equity and
efficiency. When a program allocates early action credits they must be
subtracted from the total permit budget to ensure the integrity of the
52
overall emissions cap. To illustrate, assume that the national cap for
the compliance period is set at ten million metric tons of CO2 and that
there are only two covered entities with identical historical baselines,
so each is allocated five million metric tons. Assume further that
Company A can prove with certainty that it reduced its emissions
from a business-as-usual scenario by one million metric tons of CO2
before the compliance period. If Company A is provided credit for its
early reduction and thus allowed to emit six million metric tons of
CO2, Company B’s permit allocation must be reduced to four million
to ensure that the total emissions for Company A and B remain
within the cap. Some have questioned the equity of redistributing
permit allocations in favor of early actors in this way.53
It is vital to note, however, that this hypothetical ignores the
question of how the cap of ten million metric tons of CO2 was
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 185.
50. See supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text.
51. See Michaelowa & Stronzik, supra note 46, at 186 (“To encourage reductions prior to
the first commitment period without risking a comparative disadvantage one could think of
granting credits which can be used against future obligations.”).
52. Id. at 189–90.
53. Id. at 192–93.
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derived. Assume that dangerous climate change will occur if the
United States emits more than 200 million metric tons of CO2 over a
twenty year period.54 Further assume that it took the United States
ten years to develop a regulatory program, during which time 100
million metric tons of CO2 were emitted into the atmosphere, leaving
100 million available to be emitted during the second ten-year period.
If Company A had not voluntarily reduced its emissions by 1 million
metric tons prior to regulation, only 99 million would have been
available at the start of the compliance period. Therefore, if the total
emissions budget is simply set at 10 million per year and divided
evenly between Companies A and B, Company B will receive a
windfall of permits for one-half million metric tons of CO2. It will
have proceeded with business as usual at the expense of Company A.
If, on the other hand, a budget of 99 million metric tons is divided
between Companies A and B, but Company A is also allowed to
claim and use or sell permits equal to its early reductions, the total
budget will remain the same but the benefits will inure solely to the
early actor.
The central argument against early action credit is that the
emissions reductions claimed by corporations and other entities are of
questionable credibility, and therefore providing credit for such
reductions will unnecessarily reduce the amount of permits available
to other entities and increase the overall societal costs of emissions
reductions55 This argument carried greater force in the late 1990s,
when greenhouse gas accounting and reporting procedures were in
their infancy. In contrast, each of the four major greenhouse gas
emissions reductions registries used in the United States56 is based
54. In reality, to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon at less than twice
preindustrial levels, total accumulated CO2 emissions between the years 2001 and 2100 must be
reduced between 365 and 735 gigatons of carbon (GtC) and the emissions per year must fall
below 1990 levels by 2040. PHILIBERT & PERSHING, supra note 31, at 25. What portion of this
budget should be allocated to the United States is quite obviously a very controversial subject.
55. Raymond Kopp et al., A Proposal for Credible Early Action in U.S. Climate Policy,
WEATHERVANE, Feb. 16, 1999, http://www.rff.org/~kopp/popular_articles/feature060.html
(“[Early action crediting] risks distributing too many credits for questionable early reductions.
The only way to reduce this risk is to thoroughly examine each project and evaluate the true
reductions incurred—a cumbersome and potentially expensive administrative process.”).
56. Three of the four registries, the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the Climate Leader’s
Program, and the California Climate Action Registry, are discussed infra Part III. The fourth is
the Eastern Climate Registry, which underlies the RGGI program. See EASTERN CLIMATE
REGISTRY, EASTERN CLIMATE REGISTRY VOLUNTARY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS vi
(2006), available at http://www.easternclimateregistry.org/documents/ECR%20Voluntary%20
Reporting%20Requirements_Sept_2006.pdf.
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upon a widely accepted protocol developed by the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and World
Resources Institute (WRI) that ensures that reported reductions are
57
real, verifiable, and additional. California and the RGGI’s registries
will contain highly credible records of reductions achieved pursuant
to state laws,58 and the DOE’s registration requirements under the
1605(b) Program were revised in April of 2006 to “enhance the
measurement accuracy, reliability and verifiability of information
reported.”59 As long as credits are only available for emissions
reductions registered under such advanced reporting programs, there
is less need for concern that credits will be provided for nonadditional
reductions, reductions that would have occurred in the absence of the
program.
Although arguments for the equity, efficiency, and
environmental benefits of early action crediting provide no guarantee
that such credit will ultimately be bestowed, it is highly likely that a
future federal regulatory program will provide some form of valuable
recognition for the achievements of early actors. With RGGI and
California implementing mandatory emissions reductions programs
that will cover large segments of the economy, hundreds of the
nation’s most important companies participating in voluntary
reductions programs, and accounting and verifiability methods
increasing in accuracy, the case is simply too strong and the stakes too
high not to give credit where credit is due.
III. THE LEGAL BASIS OF EARLY ACTION CREDIT
The issue of providing legal entitlements for early emissions
reductions first became an important topic of debate after the United
States signed the Kyoto Protocol. Climate change commentators
quickly realized that greenhouse gas emitters would have no legal
assurance that a future federal regulatory regime would recognize or
credit their early emissions reductions unless Congress explicitly

57. WORLD RES. INST., THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 4 (Rev. Ed., 2004), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/ghg_protocol_2004.pdf.
58. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assemb. B. No. 32 (to be codified at
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530 (2006)); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Model
Rule, Subpart XX-8 (2007), http://www.rggi.org/modelrule.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
59. Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg. 20,784, 20,785
(Apr. 21, 2006) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2006)).
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60
provided for it by statute. Several nonprofit organizations offered
proposals regarding early action credits, and a number of legislators
introduced bills regarding early action credits in Congress.61
Ultimately, no early action legislation was passed and the topic died
along with the prospect of implementing the Kyoto Protocol when the
United States withdrew from the treaty in 2001.62 With the recent
revival of federal interest in climate change regulation, the debate
over creating legal entitlements for early actors has begun to
resurface. This section identifies the current lack of a legal basis for
providing early action credit and discusses the use of voluntary
emissions registries as a means of increasing the future verifiability of
present emissions reductions.
Congress could provide credit for early emissions reductions
either prospectively or retroactively. Under a prospective approach,
legislation would create legal entitlements for current emissions
reductions that could be used once a federal cap-and-trade program is
enacted. Alternatively, Congress could wait until it enacts a cap-andtrade program and include provisions that award credits retroactively
for past emissions reductions. A prospective approach is preferable
because it provides greater certainty to emitters and therefore
stimulates more early emissions reductions. Unfortunately, it also
requires Congress to act under the assumption that a future emissions
cap will be enacted, which makes it less politically viable than the
retroactive approach.63
The only piece of prospective early action credit legislation
introduced in the 109th Congress was the Climate Change
64
Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005.
Senator Chuck Hagel introduced this bill to amend the Energy Policy
65
Act of 1992. The original version contained provisions that would

60. See NORDHAUS ET AL., supra note 41, at 18 (“If [an early action credit] program is to
have binding effect, then it will have to be authorized by law.”).
61. See, e.g., S. 547, 106th Cong. (1999) (authorizing the provision of regulatory credit for
voluntary early greenhouse gas emissions); H.R. 2520, 106th Cong. (1999) (same).
62. The United States withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 after George W. Bush
became president. See Greg Kahn, Note, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush
Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548, 549–56 (2003) (chronicling the events leading up
to and the Bush administration’s reasons for withdrawing from the treaty).
63. See NORDHAUS ET AL., supra note 41, at 17–21 (summarizing approaches that Congress
could take to provide early action credit).
64. Climate Change Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005, S. 388,
109th Cong. (2005).
65. Id.
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have provided the DOE with legal authority to issue early emissions
66
reduction credits. Specifically, in section 1612 the bill provided the
secretary of energy with authority to enter into “voluntary
agreements” with entities willing to report and reduce their
emissions.67 The act stated that the Secretary “shall” provide
transferable credits to such an entity with “certified emissions
reductions relative to [their] baseline level that . . . shall be applicable
toward any incentive, market-based, or regulatory program
determined by Congress to be necessary and feasible to reduce the
68
risk of climate change and effects of climate change.” These
provisions sparked some controversy among groups opposed to
federal action on climate change,69 and Senator Hagel subsequently
70
introduced another version lacking the early action credit provisions.
71
Neither bill made it out of committee.
Federal and state agencies administering voluntary emissions
reporting and reduction programs have provided some indication that
a future federal regulatory program could recognize early
72
reductions. In relation to the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the DOE
Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting provide that if
an entity meets all the registration requirements for emissions
reductions, the Energy Information Administration will notify it that
the reductions have been “credited” as “registered reductions” that
can be held “for use (including transfer to other entities) in the event
a future program that recognizes such reductions is enacted into
law.”73 This provision provides no legal claim to early emissions
credits without subsequent action by Congress. It does, however,

66. Id.
67. Id. § 1612(a)(6).
68. Id. § 1612(e)(1)(D).
69. Letter from Marlo Lewis, Jr., Competitive Enterprise Institute, to Senator Domenici,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Natural Res. (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.cei.org/gencon/
019,04447.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
70. See Climate Change Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005, S.
887, 109th Cong. (2005) (containing no early action credit provisions).
71. The Library of Congress THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:
SN00388:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (tracking the first version); The
Library of Congress THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN00887:@@@
L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (tracking the second version).
72. See, e.g., Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.12
(2006) (referencing the possibility that a future federal regulatory program would recognize
early action credits).
73. Id.
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express the DOE’s confidence that the standards and procedures
contained in its newly revised reporting guidelines have progressed to
a level where emissions reductions can be recorded with sufficient
accuracy to warrant allocation of entitlements.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also administers a
voluntary emissions reporting and reduction program called Climate
74
Leaders. The Climate Leaders program documentation only
indirectly intimates that registered reductions may evolve into credits
75
in the future. It defines a greenhouse gas “credit” as “a convertible
and transferable instrument usually bestowed by a [greenhouse gas]
program”76 and specifically points out that “future financial
accounting standards may treat [greenhouse gas] emissions as
77
liabilities and emissions allowances/credits as assets.” The program,
however, provides no indication that future federal regulations will
credit or recognize emissions reductions properly registered
according to its guidelines. Despite the program’s silence on the
subject, it is clear that at least some participants expect that their
efforts may be convertible into some form of credit in the future.78
A third voluntary greenhouse gas emissions registry is the
California Climate Action Registry, which the state established in
79
2000. California created the registry in part “[t]o ensure that
participating organizations receive appropriate consideration for
certified emissions results under any future state, federal or
international regulatory regime relating to [greenhouse gas]
emissions.”80 To this end, “[t]he State of California has promised to
74. Climate Leaders, FACT SHEET (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency), Mar. 2007, at 1–2,
available at http://www.epa.gov/stateply/docs/partnership_fact_sheet.pdf.
75. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE LEADERS GREENHOUSE
GAS INVENTORY PROTOCOL: DESIGN PRINCIPLES 5 (2005) (explaining how disclosure leads to
more effective management, thereby increasing the likelihood of greater program efficiency).
76. Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 11.
78. For example, Frito-Lay, Inc. states on the Climate Leaders website: “Realizing that
GHG reductions represent a corporate asset that the company wanted to protect, Frito-Lay
chose a highly transparent, rigorous, and credible reporting process . . . . Frito-Lay also believes
it is important to register its GHG emission reductions to allow the company to take credit for
its accomplishments in the event that tougher regulations are enacted in the future.” EPA,
Climate Leaders, Partners, http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/partners/partners/fritolayinc.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
79. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, GEN. REPORTING PROTOCOL pt. 1, 2 (2003),
available at http://www.climateregistry.org/docs/PROTOCOLS/General%20Reporting%20
Protocol%20DRAFT%20Oct03.pdf.
80. Id.
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use its best efforts to ensure that reported emissions receive
appropriate consideration in the event of future [greenhouse gas]
81
regulation.” Although there is no reason to doubt that California
will honor this promise in good faith, its commitment is less than
legally binding upon it or the federal government.
Because early actors lack any prospective legal commitment to
receive credit for present emissions reductions, they must rely upon
the verifiability of their reductions and a retroactive provision of
credit by future congressional legislation. A company’s ability to
ensure that its emissions reductions are verifiable is complicated by
the fact that there are several independent state and federal systems
for accounting for and reporting emissions reductions. Although each
of the four major greenhouse gas emissions reductions registries is
82
based upon WBCSD-WRI protocol, there are differences among the
registries that could affect the provision of credit under future federal
legislation.
The DOE’s 1605(b) Program, for example, distinguishes between
emissions that are merely “reported” and those that are
83
“registered.” Only emissions that are “registered” are eligible for
84
credit under a future regulatory program, and so must meet more
stringent accounting requirements than those that are merely
“reported.” Each reporting entity must establish an emissions
inventory that accounts for its direct, indirect, and sequestered
emissions for a specified year.85 The DOE’s Technical Guidelines for
the program identify various emissions estimation methods and assign
each a numerical rank: 4.0 (for A-rated methods) to 1.0 (for D-rated
methods).86 Those wishing to register emissions reductions must use
estimation methods to produce their emissions inventory that achieve
87
an average score of 3.0. Alternatively, they can have their emissions
inventory independently verified by a qualified auditor.88 Reporting
entities must calculate their registered emissions reductions with

81. Id.
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83. Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. §
300.1(b)–(c) (2006).
84. Id. § 300.12.
85. Id. § 300.6.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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reference to a baseline year no earlier than 1996 and must achieve
89
them no earlier than 2002.
California’s registry is quite different than the DOE’s. It makes
no distinction between reported and registered emissions reductions.
Rather, an entity must calculate its inventory of emissions for any
given year using specified methodologies for each type of emissions
90
producing activity. The entity must then have its calculations
certified by an approved third-party.91 An entity’s baseline for
calculating emissions reductions can be any year, starting with 1990,
92
for which a certified emissions inventory exists.
Because of the differences in methodologies used to estimate
emissions, certification requirements, and baseline restrictions,
emissions that qualify for registration under 1605(b) may not be
recognized under California’s system, and vice versa. For instance,
emissions reductions achieved from 1990 through 2001 can be
registered under California’s system, but not under the 1605(b)
93
Program. In contrast, emissions reductions receiving an average B
quality rating, and therefore registrable under the 1605(b) Program,
may not be registered under California’s program if the prescribed
methods were not used or if the reductions were not independently
certified.94 Early emissions reducers therefore must choose between
incurring the cost of complying with more than one registry’s
requirements, or identifying the single registry that maximizes their
chances for future recognition of emissions reductions. On the one
hand, the data contained in California’s registry is highly credible
because of its stringent registration requirements and its breadth of
coverage.95 On the other hand, given that the 1605(b) Program was
revised specifically to increase the verifiability of registered emissions
96
reductions and now includes a provision on potential future credit, it

89. Id. § 300.5(b)(1)–(2).
90. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at pt. 1, 17.
91. Id. at pt. 1, 18.
92. Id. at pt. 3, 2.
93. Id. (allowing registration of reductions from 1990 to 2001); see also Voluntary
Greenhouse Gas Reporting: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.1(c)(1) (2006) (“To be eligible
for registration, a reduction must [generally] have been achieved after 2002.”).
94. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at pt. 1, 2.
95. See id. at pt. 1, 2–4 (describing the California registry’s requirements and coverage).
96. See source cited supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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would be a mistake to forego participation in this federal registry. As
the next Part will show, choosing between registries is but one of
many concerns for greenhouse gas emitters seeking to realize the
benefits of their early reduction efforts through retroactive crediting
legislation.
IV. CREDIT FOR PAST REDUCTIONS IN PROPOSED CLIMATE
CHANGE LEGISLATION
Certain design elements of a mandatory greenhouse gas
emissions cap will determine whether and to what extent early
emissions reducers can claim credit for their past emissions
reductions. This Part first identifies those design elements and then
proceeds to describe and evaluate how four leading legislative
proposals have addressed early action credit.
A. Design Elements of the Future Carbon Cap
Federal legislation could place a number of restrictions on the
provision of credit for early emissions reductions. Such legislation
could, for example, provide credit only for reductions achieved during
a specified period, or limit how many credits a covered entity can use
to meet its compliance obligations.98 A future federal cap-and-trade
system’s method for calculating entity baselines and allocating the
overall emissions budget will also affect early actors’ emissionsrelated entitlements.99 Choice of registry is also significant to early
actors because future congressional legislation may restrict which
100
registries’ emissions reductions will receive credit. Table 1 and the
following discussion summarize the importance of various aspects of
cap-and-trade systems to early emissions reducers.101

97. See id. § 300.12 (referencing the possibility that a future federal regulatory program
would recognize early action credits).
98. Regulations that cap the amount of early action credit that can be applied to
compliance obligations do so presumably to mitigate the effect that such credit has on the
overall emissions cap. However, as explained in Part II, this is an inequitable transfer of benefits
from early actors to organizations that proceed with business-as-usual.
99. See supra Part II.
100. See infra Part IV.B.
101. Table 1 summarizes factors already introduced in Parts I–III of this Note. It also
summarizes several new factors that will be introduced in Part IV. A comprehensive treatment
of each factor is beyond the scope of this Note. Attention is drawn to these factors to alert the
reader to their importance in evaluating future climate change legislation.
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Table 1. Elements of Future Greenhouse Gas Regulation Affecting
Early Actors and Their Importance
Factor

Importance to Early Actors

Credit for early reductions

To encourage early emissions reductions, legislation
should expressly provide early emissions
reduction credits and should not impose
percentage limits on their use.
The emissions reduction registration method must
ensure verifiability without needlessly restricting
eligibility for credit.

Baseline calculation
method

Calculation method should allow setting entities’
baselines to some year before emissions
reductions were achieved.

Allocation of overall
emissions cap

Cap should not indirectly include verified emissions
reductions attributable to early actors or, if it
does, early actors should have first priority in
permit allocation.

Regulated greenhouse
gases

Early actors should concentrate on gases covered by
a future regulatory regime.
Greenhouse gases with higher global warming
potentials may yield more credits.

Provisions on offsets

To encourage early investment in third party
emissions reductions, legislation should provide
credit for verifiable offsets and should not impose
percentage limitations on their use.
Early actors should note restrictions on project types
(sequestration, destruction) and locations
(domestic, international).

6.Covered entities

Entities inside cap should invest in reductions to
bank for future compliance.
Entities outside cap should seek investment from
entities inside the cap and sell offsets.

Another consideration is which greenhouse gases will be covered
by the regulation. There are six major greenhouse gases covered by
domestic emissions registries: (1) carbon dioxide (CO2), (2) methane
(CH4), (3) nitrous oxide (N2O), (4) hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), (5)
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and (6) sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).102 Early
emissions reductions in greenhouse gases that are not covered by

102.

CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at xiv.
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future regulation will not yield credits. More significantly, each
greenhouse gas has a different degree of effect upon global warming,
103
called a “global warming potential.” Assuming that Congress
chooses to regulate gases with higher global warming potentials more
stringently, reducing emissions of such gases could yield more credits.
Entities considering whether to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions should also consider what kinds of emitters the proposed
regulations will cover. Based upon industry segment, quantity of
emissions, and other factors, each regulation will separate all
greenhouse gas emitters into two groups—those that fall inside and
those that fall outside of the cap. Entities within the cap will want to
seek credits that they can apply toward their permit budget, whereas
entities outside the cap could potentially sell credits to entities within
the cap. For example, if a proposed cap-and-trade system caps
emissions from electric power generators but not from agricultural
sources, electric power generators could purchase the rights to
emissions reductions achieved by agricultural sources. The availability
of this strategy depends, however, on the provision of “offset” credits
within the cap-and-trade system.
Entities can also reduce emissions within their own operations by
improving energy efficiency or changing industrial processes
104
(“ordinary emissions reductions”). Alternatively, an entity can
contract with outside actors to achieve greenhouse gas reductions
(“offsets”). A simple example would be to pay another company to
reduce its emissions and acquire the legal rights to those reductions
by contract. These are sometimes referred to as “off-system”
reductions,105 but are more commonly known as “offsets”106 because a
company is not actually reducing its own emissions, but rather
offsetting them with reductions elsewhere that are equally beneficial
to the global atmosphere. A cap-and-trade system can encourage
corporations to begin investing in reductions by third parties by
providing credit for offset reductions achieved before implementation
of the cap.
103. The “global warming potential” of a given greenhouse gas is defined as “[t]he ratio of
radiative forcing (degree of harm to the atmosphere) that would result from the emission of one
unit of a given [greenhouse gas] to one unit of CO2.” Id.
104. HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 16.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.2
(2006) (“Offset means an emission reduction that [is included in a 1605(b) report and] meets the
requirements of this part, but is achieved by a party other than the reporting entity.”).
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Measurement and verification of offsets is not necessarily
different from ordinary emissions reductions; they can consist of the
exact same activity with the exact same resultant reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions. The off-site location of the reduction,
however, typically causes most regulatory schemes to treat offsets
differently than ordinary emissions reductions to ensure that a net
107
reduction in emissions has actually taken place. For example, where
international offsets are allowed in a country that has not capped its
overall greenhouse gas emissions, there is a risk that emissions
reductions achieved by one entity will simply result in an increase in
emissions by another entity, resulting in no net emissions reduction.
Regulations therefore place restrictions on the location of offsets,
specify verification procedures for offset reductions, and limit the
amount of the compliance obligation that can be met through offset
credits.
B. Early Action Credit Provisions in Four Senate Bills
Each of these design elements takes a different form in the capand-trade systems that have been proposed in the Senate. This
Section introduces and explains four of the most noteworthy
proposed programs.108 The next Section evaluates these bills in terms
of equity and effectiveness in inducing early emissions reductions
through early action credit.
1. The McCain-Lieberman “Climate Stewardship and
Innovation Act of 2005.”109 In 2003, Senators John McCain and
Joseph Lieberman introduced this bill, which was defeated by a
relatively narrow vote of 55 to 43. It was reintroduced as the “Climate
Stewardship and Innovation Act” in 2005 and was again defeated, but

107. See Choi, supra note 45, at 934–40 (describing offset activities and explaining the
attendant inventory, monitoring, and verification problems).
108. In addition to the bills discussed below, Senator Feinstein has announced and
circulated a draft bill entitled “The Strong Economy and Climate Protection Act.” Although it
is widely believed that Senator Feinstein will introduce this bill in the 110th Congress, the bill
itself was not publicly available for review at the time of writing this Note. A general outline of
its provisions is available on the Senator’s website. Sen. Diane Feinstein, Senator Feinstein
Outlines New Legislation to Curb Global Warming, Keep Economy Strong (Mar. 20, 2006),
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/r-global-warm320.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
109. Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
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110
by a somewhat wider margin, 60 to 38. Senator John McCain has
stated that he intends to introduce the bill for a third time and
believes that chances are “pretty good” that it could pass in the 110th
111
Congress.
The Climate Stewardship Act proposed capping greenhouse gas
emissions by covered entities after the year 2010 at less than “5896
112
million metric tons,” measured in carbon dioxide equivalents. This
capped emissions at 1990 levels in accordance with the UNFCCC’s
113
Article 4, as well as its Article 2 goal of preventing “dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”114 To ensure the
adequacy of the cap in meeting this goal, the Act called on the
115
secretary of commerce to review it biennially. It defined greenhouse
gas emissions to include all six major greenhouse gases.116 The Act’s
cap included all entities in the electric power, industrial, or
commercial sectors of the economy that emitted 10,000 metric tons of
greenhouse gases per year.117 It also included all refiners or importers
of petroleum products for transportation, and all producers or
importers of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 that emitted more than 10,000
metric tons of greenhouse gases per year upon consumption.118
Noticeably absent was any inclusion of emissions from the
agricultural sector.
The Act had extensive early emissions reductions provisions. It
proposed the creation of a new National Greenhouse Gas Emissions

110. Pamela Najor, McCain-Lieberman Amendment Fails Again on Senate Floor in Second
Try in Two Years, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1277 (2005). It is noteworthy that Senator Boxer voted
for the bill in 2003 but against it in 2005 because of the inclusion of provisions on nuclear energy
in the bill. 151 CONG. REC. S7018 (2005) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (“I wish that I could support
the McCain-Lieberman amendment, as I did 2 years ago. But by making the nuclear industry
eligible for yet more subsidies, as a matter of principle, I cannot vote for this year's version.”).
Senator Boxer now chairs the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee. Senator Boxer
Reorganizes Environment Panel, Naming Two Global Warming Subcommittees, 37 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 46 (2006).
111. Amena H. Saiyid, McCain, Lieberman to Reintroduce Bill Requiring Reductions in
Greenhouse Gases, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2382 (2006). Senator McCain made this
announcement on November 16, 2006, at the opening of the Washington, D.C., office of Duke
University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. Id.
112. S. 1151 § 331(a)(1).
113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 32, art. 4.
114. Id. art. 2.
115. S. 1151 § 334(a)(3).
116. Id. § 3(9).
117. Id. § 3(5)(B).
118. Id. § 3(5)(A)–(B).
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119
Database. The Database was to include emissions reductions
achieved by regulated entities after 1990 and before 2010, and
achieved by unregulated entities at any time after 1990.120 Under the
Act, entities had four years from the enactment of the law to register
emissions reductions achieved before the establishment of the
national database.121
To register an emissions reduction, the Act required an entity to
establish a baseline and report to the administrator all of its
greenhouse gas emissions for each year in which reductions took
place.122 The Act did not specify a methodology for calculating an
entity’s baseline. It simply defined “baseline” as “the historic
greenhouse gas emissions levels of an entity,” but qualified that the
administrator would adjust the baseline upward “to reflect actual
reductions that [were] verified” according to the relevant
regulations.123 The administrator was to review the entity’s report to
ensure that it indicated “actual reductions in direct greenhouse gas
emissions” relative to the entity’s historic emissions levels, “after
accounting for any increases in indirect emissions.”124 The methods
and standards used in this review would have been promulgated by
the administrator through rulemaking in coordination with the
secretary of energy and the secretary of agriculture.125
The Act required that the administrator first allocate permits to
entities that had registered emissions reductions in the national
database prior to the first year that compliance was mandated, which
was 2010. If an entity elected to use a registered, pre-2010 emissions
reduction to comply with its budget in a given year, the Act directed
the administrator to award the entity with permits equal to those
registered reductions and to subtract that amount from the total
126
permit budget for the year. Entities covered by state mandatory
greenhouse gas reduction programs would also have been entitled to
priority allocation of permits if the state’s program was at least as

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 201–04.
Id. § 203(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 203(c)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 203(c)(1).
Id. § 3(2).
Id. § 203(c)(3)(A)–(B).
Id. § 204(a)(1).
Id. § 335(a)(1)(A)–(C).
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127
stringent as that created by the Act. Any permits remaining after
the early actors’ elections had been satisfied would have been
distributed according to a process created by the administrator. The
bill specifically instructed the administrator to ensure that the process
would “not penalize a covered entity for emissions reductions made
before 2010 and registered with the database,”128 and to consider
“binding state actions in making the final determination of
129
allocation[s]” to covered entities.
Finally, the Act allowed covered entities to meet 15 percent of
130
their compliance obligations through offsets. These included credits
obtained from another nation’s markets for greenhouse gas
emissions, credits from a registered net increase in carbon
sequestration by another entity, and credits from emissions
reductions registered in the database by entities not covered under
the Act.131

2. The Bingaman “Climate and Economy Insurance Act of
2005.”132 Senator Jeff Bingaman, chairman of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, initially drafted this act as an
amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, but it was never
introduced. The senator intends to introduce climate change
legislation, believing that it would be a mistake to wait until President
George W. Bush’s second term ends in 2008 to create a federal capand-trade system.133
Rather than placing an absolute cap on total greenhouse gas
emissions, this Act set an emissions cap based upon “emissions
intensity,” which was to be calculated by dividing the total
greenhouse gas emissions for all covered entities in the United States
134
by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Using the intensity metric
for 2009 as a starting point, the Act required a 2.4 percent reduction
in emissions intensity for covered sectors of the United States

127. Id. § 335(b).
128. Id. § 333(b)(3).
129. Id. § 333(h).
130. Id. § 302(b).
131. Id. § 302(b)(1)–(3).
132. 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing an amendment, the
Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)).
133. Dean Scott, U.S. PIRG Report Says Bingaman’s Approach Would Do Little to Halt
Increased Emissions, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 547 (2006).
134. 151 CONG. REC. at S7090 (proposing § 1512(4)).
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135
economy for each year between 2010 and 2019. The total permit
budget for each year was calculated by multiplying the emissions
intensity target for that year by the projected GDP.136 The Act would
137
have covered emissions of all six major greenhouse gases. It
targeted CO2 emissions by regulating fuel distributors, cement and
lime producers, and aluminum smelters without a minimum quantity
138
of emissions threshold. Manufacturers and importers of HFCs,
PFCs, SF6, and N2O also would have been regulated regardless of how
much they emitted.139 Only coal mines were subject to an emissions
threshold; mines would have been included within the cap only if they
140
emitted more than 35 million cubic feet of CH4 in 2004.
The Act directed the secretary of energy to devise a system to
allocate permits to regulated entities and “affected nonregulated
entities” based on their historical emissions levels, the “mitigation of
significant and disproportionate burdens,” and the avoidance of
141
“windfalls.” It required the program to include a means of
allocating credits for early emissions reductions to any entity that
reported its reductions under the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the EPA’s
Climate Leaders Program, or a state or privately administered
registry.142 Permits for early emissions reductions, however, were
143
limited to 1 percent of the year’s total allowance allocation.
Under the Act, certain specified offset activities would have
produced credits that regulated entities could purchase to meet their
compliance obligations. Within the United States, credits were to be
allocated to entities for sequestering CO2 or destroying HFCs, PFCs,
144
SF6, or N2O before it was emitted. The Act provided no limitation
on the amount of such credits that a regulated entity could submit in
lieu of permits. It also directed the secretary of energy to establish a
program for crediting offsets from international projects.145 The Act
allowed regulated entities to submit credits earned from international

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. (proposing § 1513(a)(1)–(2)).
Id. (proposing § 1513(a)(3)).
Id. (proposing § 1512(6)).
Id. (proposing § 1512(8), (12)).
Id. (proposing § 1512(8)).
Id. (proposing § 1512(8)).
Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(a)(4)).
Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1520(c)).
Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)).
Id. at S7092 (proposing § 1518(2), (5)).
Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1519(d)).
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offsets projects only to meet a specific percentage of their compliance
obligation, starting at 3 percent in 2010 and rising gradually to 10
146
percent in 2020.
147
3. The Carper “Clean Air Planning Act of 2006.” The content
of Senator Tom Carper’s bill was not strictly limited to climate
change, but rather proposed a number of emissions regulations to
reduce pollution from power plants.148 The bill nevertheless included
substantial provisions outlining a trading system for CO2 emissions. It
capped only CO2 emissions, leaving other greenhouse gases
uncapped.149 It also only capped emissions from fossil fuel-fired
facilities that generated electricity for sale and had the capacity to
150
produce more than 25 megawatts. Under Senator Carper’s bill, the
cap for CO2 in 2010 equaled the total emissions from covered entities
in 2006.151 In 2015, the cap would have been lowered to 2001 emissions
152
The Act specified the method by which the EPA
levels.
administrator was to allocate emissions permits to covered entities.
The total quantity of permits allocated in a given year was first to be
reduced by a certain amount to create a “new unit reserve” and a
reserve to provide incentives for advanced clean coal technology.153
The Act then allocated the remaining permits to covered entities
according to their proportionate share of total electricity generation
in the United States during the prior three years.154
Although the cap only applied to CO2 emissions, the Act
instructed the administrator to promulgate regulations to provide
credit for offsets and early reductions of all six major greenhouse
155
gases. Early reduction credits would have been available for
greenhouse gas emissions reductions or sequestration projects that
took place in the United States between the year 2000 and 2010, and

146. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)).
147. Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006).
148. Steven D. Cook, Carper Reintroduces Bill to Cut Emissions from Power Plants,
Including Carbon Dioxide, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 937 (2006).
149. S. 2724 § 701(1)(B).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 705(c)(1).
152. Id. § 705(c)(2).
153. Id. § 705(f)(2)(B).
154. Id. § 705(f)(2)(A).
155. Id. § 705(g)(1), (h)(1). “Greenhouse gas” is defined to include all six major greenhouse
gases. Id. § 701(6). See supra text accompanying note 102 (identifying the six gases).
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that were reported under the DOE’s 1605(b) Program or a state or
156
regional greenhouse gas registry. Though the Act did not make
clear how those credits were to fit into the specified permit allocation
procedures, it stated that they were not to exceed 10 percent of the
cap for 2011.157 This implies that early reduction credits would have
either been added to or subtracted from the overall emissions cap.
The Act was also ambiguous about whether early reduction credits
would have been available for years after 2011, perhaps leaving this to
the discretion of the administrator.
Under Senator Carper’s plan, offset credits were available for
projects that achieved reductions that were “real, surplus,
enforceable, verifiable, permanent,” and that were monitored,
reported, and verified in accordance with the administrator’s
regulations.158 The administrator’s regulations were to consider offsets
issued by California, RGGI, or any other state with a comparable
159
offset program. The Act contained no limits on the amount of
credits from offsets projects that a covered entity could use to meet its
compliance obligations.
4. The Kerry-Snowe “Global Warming Reduction Act of
2006.”160 Senators John Kerry and Olympia J. Snowe introduced this
bill in October of 2006, just before Congress’s recess.161 It is the least
specific plan considered in this Note, leaving a great deal of discretion
to the EPA administrator. It placed a cap on emissions of the six
major greenhouse gases in the United States, requiring a 1.5 percent
reduction from 2000 levels in 2010, a 2.5 percent reduction from 2000
levels in 2020, and a 3.5 percent reduction from 2000 levels in 2030.162
Under the Act, the administrator had full discretion to decide which
sectors of the economy were to be responsible for achieving this cap,
subject only to the requirement that covered sectors be those with the
greatest emissions and the most cost-effective opportunities for

156. S. 2724 § 705(h)(1)–(2).
157. Id. § 705(h)(3).
158. Id. § 705(g)(2)(B), (D).
159. Id. § 705(g)(3).
160. Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. (2006).
161. Darren Samuelsohn, Sens. Kerry, Snowe Introduce Global Warming Bill, E&E NEWS
PM, Oct. 3, 2006 (on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/print/2006/10/03/2 (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
162. S. 4039 § 702(b)(1).
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163
reductions. The president, in consultation with the administrator,
was to create a plan to allocate permits to covered entities. The Act
explicitly would have forbidden the plan from resulting in windfall
profits to any covered entity and required it to be approved by
Congress.164 The contours of the emissions trading program, such as
potential credit for early emissions reductions or offsets, was left to
165
the discretion of the administrator.

C. Evaluation of Early Action Credit Provisions in Four Senate Bills
Each of the four bills discussed in this Note incorporated
different design elements that would have affected early emissions
reducers’ ability to claim credit for their past emissions reductions.
Table 2 summarizes the differences between each of these proposed
cap-and-trade systems.166
Of the four proposals, the McCain-Lieberman Climate
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005 was by far the most
favorable to early emissions reducers. The bill ensured that entities
that proceeded with business as usual would not reap the benefits of
early reducers’ efforts. It did so by giving priority allocation of
permits to entities with registered early emissions reductions,167 and
by requiring an entity’s baseline to be set in a manner that would not
penalize it for early reductions.168 The Act also provided early
reducers in all registries with a fair chance to prove that their early
emissions reductions were real and verified. This was accomplished
by directing the EPA administrator to create a new registry and to
consult with the DOE about methods for verifying the accuracy of the
information.169 The Act further instructed the administrator to
consider emissions reductions achieved under mandatory state and
170
regional programs. Emissions achieved as far back as 1990 were

163.
164.
165.
166.
IV.B.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. § 703(b).
Id. § 703(d).
Id. § 703(a).
Table 2 omits the citations to each of the bills’ provisions, which can be found in Part
See supra Part IV.B.1.
Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. § 335 (2005).
Id. § 201.
Id. § 333(h).

Presidential
discretion.

All.

Cap derived from year 2009 Reduce cap by “new unit
intensity, divided among
reserve” and “clean coal
regulated and “affected”
reserve.”
entities.
All.

Priority to entities with
registered early
reductions or covered
by mandatory state
programs.
All.

Sequestration/destruction:
15 percent of obligation
U.S. (no limit); Int’l
from other markets or
(3 percent of 2010
from registered
obligation, 10 percent in
reduction/sequestration
2020).
by unregulated entity.
Electric., industrial. &
Fuel distributors; cement,
commercial. entities; oil
lime & alum. producers;
refiners & importers;
coal mines; non-CO2 gas
non-CO2 gas producers
producers/importers.
& importers.

Allocation of
emissions cap

Gases

Offset provisions

Covered entities

EPA discretion.

EPA discretion, but
must include sectors
with greatest
emissions and costeffective reductions.

EPA system to credit
reported and verified
offsets. No limit on use.
Cal., RGGI, and other
state offsets considered.
Fossil fuel-fired facilities
that sell electricity (25
megawatt or greater
capacity).

Only CO2 capped.

EPA discretion.

2007]

Proportion of U.S.
electricity generation for
past three years.

Historic emissions levels
mitigating unfair burden
or windfalls.

Historic emissions levels
adjusted upward to
reflect verified early
reductions.

Baseline calculation

Kerry-Snowe

Pre-2010 reductions
Credit reductions achieved EPA discretion.
reported under 1605(b),
2000–2010 and reported
Climate Leaders, state or
under 1605(b) or
private registry. Limit: 1
state/regional registry.
percent of obligation.
Limit: 10 percent of cap.

Must register reductions
achieved 1990–2010.
Registration Methods
and standards set by
EPA.

Credit for early
reductions

Carper

Bingaman

McCain-Lieberman

Design Element

Cap-and-Trade Proposal

Table 2. Proposed Cap-and-Trade Systems: Differences Important to Early Emissions Reducers
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eligible for credit.171 Finally, the Act’s offset provisions encouraged
climate friendly investment by allowing regulated entities to purchase
credits from unregulated entities that achieved emissions reductions
before 2010.
The Bingaman Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005
contained two improvements to the McCain-Lieberman Act. It
explicitly stated that participants in state and even private registries,
172
such as the Chicago Climate Exchange, could receive credit for their
early emissions reductions.173 It also required the creation of a system
for recognizing and crediting offsets achieved overseas.174 However,
the value of achieving early reductions was severely hampered by
several aspects of the Act. It restricted the amount of credit that an
entity could use in a given year to 1 percent of its compliance
175
obligation. Furthermore, if a company invested in a project that
achieved emissions reductions before the start of the program, it
would have been entitled to use only a small percentage of the credits
produced.176 Even more importantly, the Act would have produced
inequitable results for early emissions reducers. It used the emissions
intensity of the entire U.S. economy to set the emissions cap, and
early reducers were not necessarily entitled to priority allocation of
permits.177 This would have allowed less efficient members of the
economy to obtain windfall credits.
Obtaining early action credit under the Carper Clean Air
Planning Act of 2006 also would have been difficult. It only allocated
credit for emissions reductions that were achieved after the year 2000
and that were registered under the 1605(b) Program or a state or
regional registry.178 Even once credit was obtained, the Act restricted
the amount of early emissions credits that could be used, and was
179
unclear about the availability of credits after 2011. It did, however,
feature a number of positive aspects. For one, early emissions
reductions did not affect an entity’s baseline because that baseline
171. Id. § 203(a)(1)–(2).
172. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing an amendment, the
Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005))
174. Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1519(d)).
175. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)).
176. See supra Part IV.B.2.
177. 151 CONG. REC. S7090 §1513(a).
178. See supra Part IV.B.3.
179. Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. § 705(h)(3) (2006).

05__DIMASCIO.DOC

2007]

7/20/2007 1:43 PM

GREENHOUSE GAS CREDITS

1617

was based upon its proportionate share of the energy market, not on
its historical emissions levels. In addition, it did not cap the use of
credits from offsets projects. This would have encouraged
investments in projects to reduce emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases.
Finally, the Kerry-Snowe Global Warming Reduction Act of
2006 delegated all the details of the cap-and-trade system to the
180
EPA. Early emissions reducers would have had the opportunity to
argue for credit during the EPA’s notice and comment proceedings.
Compared to Congress, the EPA is much more familiar with the
specifics of greenhouse gas emissions accounting and registration,
and, due to its Climate Leaders program, is aware that substantial
emissions reductions are already taking place. On the other hand,
delegating so much of the program to the EPA would have likely
produced significant delays in creating the cap-and-trade system. In
the meantime, uncertainty would have inhibited some emitters from
achieving emissions reductions. For this reason, legislation with welldefined parameters is probably preferable.
The proposed legislation considered in this Note demonstrates
that a future federal program will most likely contain some form of
credit for early action. Only the Climate Stewardship and Innovation
Act, however, truly protected the interests of early emissions
reducers. The other acts placed heavy restrictions on the recognition
and use of early reduction credits to preserve a greater proportion of
the cap for distribution among all covered entities. This approach is
both inequitable and inefficient. It is inequitable because it transfers
the benefit of the early emissions reductions to entities that proceed
with business as usual, and it is inefficient because it forestalls
investment into emissions reductions until the cap goes into effect. By
allowing greater recognition and use of early emissions reductions,
the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act would have encouraged
early investment into ordinary emissions reductions, sequestration,
and other domestic projects. Future legislative proposals should build
upon the model provided by the Climate Stewardship and Innovation
Act.

180.

Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. § 703(a) (2006).
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CONCLUSION
Greenhouse gas emitters in the United States have achieved
substantial emissions reductions through voluntary programs and
compliance with mandatory state regulations. There are several
reasons why a federal greenhouse gas emissions program should
provide credit for these early reduction efforts. First, reductions must
take place soon if the world is to meet the goal of the UNFCCC and
thereby avoid dangerous, human-induced changes in the earth’s
climate without painful disruption to national economies. Second, it
would be inequitable to allow emitters that proceed with business as
usual to benefit from the costly reduction activities undertaken by
early actors. Third, the registration guidelines promulgated by state
and federal registries have become accurate enough to verify that
emissions reductions are real, additional, and verifiable. Accordingly,
given the growing expectation that federal climate change regulations
will be promulgated by 2015, a method for crediting emissions
reductions that are verified and reported should be developed.
Early actors face several uncertainties with respect to a future
federal cap-and-trade system for regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
This Note identifies six elements of cap-and-trade systems that can
affect early actors’ ability to claim emissions reduction credits: (1)
what early reduction credits are available, (2) which baseline
calculation method is employed, (3) how the overall emissions cap is
allocated, (4) which greenhouse gases are regulated, (5) how offsets
are treated, and (6) what types of entities are regulated. From the
perspective of early emissions reducers, the ideal legislation should
prospectively provide credit for present reductions in the event that a
cap-and-trade program is enacted. Absent such legislation, a bill
providing credit for past emissions reductions would ideally credit
verifiable, registered reductions without limitations on the year in
which they were achieved or the amount of credits that could be used
to satisfy compliance obligations. An entity’s baseline should be
adjusted for early emissions reductions, and the overall cap should be
distributed in such a way that the benefits of early emissions
reductions inure solely to early actors. The regulation should cover all
major greenhouse gases and emitting industry segments and should
allow covered entities to use offsets credits to meet their compliance
obligations. If the enactment of such a regulation were foreseeable,
greenhouse gas emitters would have strong incentives both to reduce
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their own emissions and to invest in reduction, sequestration, and
other projects by third parties.
Until such regulation occurs, entities that reduce their emissions
should ensure that they accurately account for and register their
reductions in a voluntary registry. Reductions registered according to
the 1605(b) Program’s revised guidelines stand the greatest chance of
receiving federal credit due to the explicit crediting language included
in the regulation and the more stringent standards it applies to
181
“registered” reductions. Emitters should first target emissions of
greenhouse gases with high global warming potentials. Emitters
should also limit contracts for offsets reductions to domestic projects
in areas with established accounting methods under a voluntary
registry. Due to the potential for percentage limitations on use of
offsets credits, such projects should be secondary to ordinary
emissions reductions. Finally, early emissions reducers should be
vigilant of a future cap-and-trade system’s methods for calculating
baselines and allocating the emissions budget. Most legislation
allocates considerable discretion to a federal agency to design these
components of the system. Accordingly, early actors should rely upon
the equitable and efficiency arguments provided in this Note to
protect their interests throughout the agency’s rulemaking process.

181.

See supra Part III.

